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Abstract: 
The paper analyses the effects of present-biased preferences on the transfer of resources to future generations 
in the framework of renewable resources harvesting. The paper assumes that the current generation has other-
regarding motivations for future generations, which are expressed through the adherence to spontaneous other-
regarding preferences or social norms.  
Faced with the problem that the short-sighted behavior imposed by the “dictatorship of the present” can cause 
a reduction in the well-being of future generations, despite the existence of social preferences, the model 
presented in this study demonstrates that if the social preferences are also expressed through social norms that 
prescribe to not reevaluate the harvesting decisions, a mitigation of the effect of present bias on the 
intergenerational equity can occur.  
In this paper, the model presented shows the properties that a social norm should have to avoid the 
intergenerational inequality that can derive from present-biased preferences in the intergenerational renewable 
resources management. Besides the model defines the necessary and the sufficient conditions so that the 
implementation of the social norm can neutralize the effect of present-biased preferences guaranteeing the 
optimal harvesting path defined at the beginning. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few years, some studies have started to explore the applications of the non-constant 
discount rate in resource management (Settle and Shogren, 2004) and in contexts related to 
the environment (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Karp, 2005). They start to show the 
dichotomy between the present-biased agents and the rational ones (Hepburn et al., 2010; 
Winkler, 2006). However, as Gsottbauer and van den Bergh (2011) remarked, the studies that 
investigate non-constant discounting in resource management have excluded from their 
analysis the other-regarding preferences. The assertion is well-founded, and the reasons of 
the necessity to include them are clear: other-regarding preferences are found in everyday 
life, with the evidence that individuals have carefulness concepts such as fairness (Gintis, 
2000), and they adopt pro-social behaviors in a wide range of situations (Alpizar et al., 2008; 
Frey and Meier, 2004; Meier and Stutzer, 2008) and in different cultures (Henrich et al., 
2005). Furthermore, there are several robust studies that show the validity for an inclusion of 
the other-regarding motives in the study of the economic behaviors (Fehr and Gächter, 2002, 
2000; Gächter, 2007; Gintis et al., 2005).  
Often renewable resources assume an intergenerational dimension due to their intrinsic 
nature. The activity of harvesting from renewable resources is the typical context in which 
the externalities derived from the behavior of a single agent within a community often 
generate effects not only on other members of the community that take their actions at the 
same time. But frequently, negative externalities can affect future generations whose welfare 
depends on the level of impoverishment to which the resources were previously exposed. 
When the resource management can suffer the risk related to the present bias, it is necessary 
to understand in what manner present-biased behaviors affect the intertemporal dynamics in 
relation to the intergenerational preferences of a naive agent who has social preferences over 
her successors. Present bias and the resulting reversal preferences can change the outcome 
of the other-regarding choices posed at the beginning by the agent who has to leave some 
part of resources for future generations. For these reasons, the purpose of this work is to 
investigate the effects of present bias in renewable resource management, analyzing the 
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impact of myopic behaviors on the transfer of resources from the current generation to the 
next one, taking care of other-regarding and social preferences of the first generation. 
Besides, this paper focuses on the different ways in which an agent can express her social 
and other-regarding preferences. In fact, they can be expressed with the spontaneous choices 
taken in accord with other-regarding preferences without social or institutional interventions, 
but also with the compliance to the specific social norms that the community defines.  
The capability of human society to define social norms is one of the elements that 
characterize the sociability itself. In fact, communities and individuals express their other-
regarding preferences also through social norms. In this paper one of the main aims is the 
definition of the properties that a social norm need to have to avoid the negative effect of 
present-biased preferences on the transfer amount of future generations. For this reasons, this 
work will provide a model that introduce a social norm in the context in which present-biased 
preferences can affect the intergenerational equity in presence of other-regarding preferences 
of the present generation. The results will address the opportunity to adopt social norms that 
sustain the intergenerational distribution of the resources, keeping in mind that the capability 
of building a behavioral norm inside a community is one of the most important and peculiar 
features of human sociability. 
 
2. Intertemporal myopia in resource management 
Resources management is not an easy task for individuals, in particular when they have 
important decisional myopia (Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin, 2013). The intergenerational 
management of resources can suffer the conflict between long-run preferences and immediate 
choices when due to the present-biased preferences there emerges a conflict between the early 
intention of the agent and the choice made in the present. The conflict arises due to the time 
dependency of the discount rate, generating time-inconsistent decisions. A time inconsistency 
situation implies that an optimal choice defined in the present could be revisited in the future 
(Strotz, 1955). The origin of this phenomenon is the present bias that determines the 
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emergence of preference reversals. When the task involves intertemporal decisions, the 
absence of a constant discount rate determines the condition of possible revaluation of the 
choices made, changing it from what was estimated before. Behaviors that contradict the 
time-consistency assumption are widely studied (Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein and 
Prelec, 1992). The systematic tendency of a greater discount in the near future rather than in 
the distant one is a consequence of people’s impulsiveness and lack in self-control (Laibson, 
1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), and it is clear that the exponential discounting cannot 
represent this phenomenon (Laibson, 1997). 
The effects of present bias have been investigated in several areas: low saving rate (Ashraf 
et al., 2006; Harris and Laibson, 2001; Laibson, 1997; Laibson et al., 1998), health contexts 
(van der Pol and Cairns, 2002), drugs, smoking or buying addictions (Frederick et al., 2002; 
Gruber and Koszegi, 2001; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Wertenbroch, 1998), and behaviors of 
procrastination (Benabou and Tirole, 2003; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). As well as the 
areas just mentioned, resource management is a field where present bias has a strong potential 
impact. In fact, the risks associated with preference reversals and the “dictatorship of the 
present” increase in settings where long-term interests may conflict with immediate 
consumption. This conflict can typically emerge in all the fields of public and common goods 
— in public goods, this is emphasized by Winkler (2006), while in the fields of the common 
the role of present-biased preferences in the decreasing of cooperation is shown by Persichina 
(2019b) — and this conflict strongly characterizes the intergenerational resource 
management. The harvesting of natural resources is a typical area where this conflict can 
emerge. In this case, present-biased decisions can potentially lead to excessive resource 
depletion. It is shown that if non-constant discount rates are applied in the management of a 
stock of natural resources, without a commitment to the policy implemented, the possibility 
that the governance planner revaluates the plan will lead to a collapse of the resources 
(Hepburn et al., 2010). Settle and Shogren (2004) showed that non-constant discounting 
affects the optimal resource management because it makes possible offering a justification 
of a future change in the decisions of the policymaker. Therefore, in the intergenerational 
management, present-biased preferences could compromise the wise management of the 
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resource stock. The use of a higher discount rate in the short-term can determine that the 
community’s welfare — which also includes the well-being of future generations — would 
be jeopardized by the excessive weight of the present. 
However, when the query involves renewable resources from the intergenerational 
perspective, the discussion is not limited merely to the impoverishment of the stock of 
resources for effect of the allocation of the harvesting amounts over the time by the present 
generation for their own consumption preferences. In presence of more generations that 
harvest in succession from the same stock of renewable resources, the issue also involves the 
social dimension in relation to the intergenerational equity and the welfare of future 
generations. In fact, as it will be discussed in the next section, individuals have social 
preferences such that they assign a positive value to the welfare of the future generations. 
Therefore, in the intertemporal resource management, present generations also include the 
welfare of the future generations in their decision process. In this manner, the present 
generation has the aim of behaving in accordance with its own social preferences, leaving a 
given amount of resources for the consumption of the following generations. As long as the 
intertemporal choices of the individual are time-consistent, it is clear that the outcome of the 
decision taken also responds to the social preferences of the individual himself. But, in the 
absence of time-consistency, when the agent behaves myopically under the effect of present 
bias, the coherence between improved action and early intention of the individual can fade 
away. 
 
3. A retrospective on other-regarding motives 
In a common resource dilemma, the economic theory prescribes the overexploitation of 
resources, synthesized by the famous expression “tragedy of the commons” used by Hardin 
(1968). This phenomenon depends on the benefit that the agent obtains from an extra unit of 
consumption of the commons when the cost of the reduction of the stock of resources is 
divided between all the members of the community that can use it, not only between those 
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who consume the extra units. Therefore, agents who take decisions exclusively based on their 
own self-interest without caring about the consequences on the wealth of others, contribute 
to the overexploitation of the common resources. The standard assumption about the 
economic behavior of agents is the axiom of self-interest. This axiom is a behavioral 
assumption that is defined in function of a coherent adhesion to the three logical processes 
that define the behavior of a homo oeconomicus: self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal, 
and self-goal choice (Sen, 1985) — building a theoretical system of economic interactions 
composed of exclusive selfish agents. However, events that contradict this assumption are 
observable daily in the reality of human interactions. The exclusive self-interested 
axiomatization does not appear to represent the peculiarities of human behavior. 
Interdependence between one’s own wealth and the others one exists, and this is the 
foundation of human society. Hence, economic issues that involve the social dimension of 
human behavior require to economists to relax the assumption that agents are only self-
interested. 
Several studies have investigated the real foundation of economics when the agents take 
decisions within a social context, showing with undoubted clarity that individual decisions 
are mediated by other-regarding motives and by social preferences, such as fairness, 
cooperation, and reciprocity (Andreoni, 1990; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and 
Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993). 
To understand the role of other-regarding preferences in social dilemmas, there are abundant 
contributions in the literature that show that fairness principles contribute to the formulation 
of the agents choices  (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter, 2007; Ostrom et al., 1992). Several 
analyses and investigations have confirmed the ability of humans to voluntarily sustain 
cooperation in the case of resource dilemmas (Andreoni, 1988; Casari and Plott, 2003; 
Charness and Villeval, 2009; Chaudhuri, 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Ledyard, 1994; 
Ostrom et al., 1992). Furthermore, the consequences of the introduction of other-regarding 
preferences in the theoretical framework of the management of commons and in 
environmental and resource issues have acquired great attention more recently (Brekke and 
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Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2012; Frey and Stutzer, 2006; 
Gowdy, 2008; Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, 2011). 
The other-regarding motives have an important role in the management of renewable 
resources in terms of equity distribution. As Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) pointed out, “other-
regarding preferences” means that the agents show these preferences when they give value 
to the payoffs of the reference agents. In the context of renewable resources, the fairness 
principle becomes a crucial element in the decision process that occurs to determine how 
much to harvest and consume in order to behave in conformity to one’s own other-regarding 
preferences. The others are not only those that simultaneously harvest the same resources but 
also the successors who will harvest in the future, when the resources are assigned for an 
intergenerational use. Hence, the inclusion of other-regarding preferences is essential for the 
equity distribution principles that affect the harvesting strategies taking care of the 
intergenerational externalities.  
Because on one side, there are no doubts about the existence of cooperation and equity 
distribution capabilities of people: these capabilities are part of the success of human 
evolution (Gintis, 2009); on the other side, the reason why societies sometimes fail to reach 
the level of fairness and intergenerational equity that they desire is unclear. For this reason, 
in the following sections, the effects of the present bias will be investigated in relation to the 
welfare of future generations and on the role that social norm can have in the maintenance of 
the intergenerational equity, when the norm is designed to sustain other-regarding preferences 
of the agent. 
 
4. Harvesting model and behavioral assumptions  
The model involves the harvesting activity from a stock of renewable resources: at time t the 
stock of resources is 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) and the amount harvested is ℎ(𝑡𝑡), the growth rate is 𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔, 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)� 
and the stock grows following: 
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𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔, 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)�𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡𝑡),  (1) 
where �𝑔𝑔, 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)� ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇]; 𝑔𝑔, strictly positive, is the natural growth rate when the 
stock size does not affect the growth rate.1 Resources are materials, so it is not possible to 
have a negative stock of resources, and the initial level of the stock is strictly positive: 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇] (2) 
with 𝑅𝑅(0) = 𝑅𝑅0 ,  𝑅𝑅0 > 0. (3) 
The amount harvested is not restorable such that: ℎ(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀  𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇]. (4) 
According to the resource constraint, the agent cannot harvest at time t more than the stock 
of resources available at the same time: ℎ(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇]. (5) 
In the model, there are two generations, a first one that harvests for T periods, and a second 
one that receives the resources leaved unharvested from the first generation.2 
The welfare’s agent of the first generation depends only on the amount harvested, and the 
utility function is expressed in the usual form: 
 
1The resources in the stock are not perishable, for this reason the growth rate is non-negative. And when 𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔,𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)�𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 0 the growth rate is a constant exponential one. 
2 The model focuses on the decision-making process of the first generation. 
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𝑈𝑈 = � 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 , (6) 
where 𝑢𝑢�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)� is monotonic and strictly concave: 𝑢𝑢′�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)� > 0 , 𝑢𝑢′′�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)� < 0. (7) 
Continuity on the harvesting amount is assumed. 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 represents the discount factor. The cases 
of neutrality in the harvesting time and of pleasure in procrastination are excluded, such that: 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 > 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 ∀ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇]. (8) 
The first generation is affected by present bias, which implies: 
⎩⎨
⎧ 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 > 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1       with   𝑡𝑡 < 𝑠𝑠   and   𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇]  for 𝑡𝑡 = 0,𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1       with   𝑡𝑡 < 𝑠𝑠   and   𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇]  for 𝑡𝑡 > 0. (9) 
Of course, in this condition, time consistency is impossible. 
In this work to express the presence of present-biased preferences in the utility function of 
the agent will be used a β𝛿𝛿 model where the present bias factor is defined with β, such that 
the expected utility of the agent at time t is given by: 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)� + 𝛽𝛽 � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)�,𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡+1  (10) 
with 0 < β < 1. 
When β is less than 1 the condition (9) holds. Instead β =1 is the specific case of absence of 
present bias, such that the discounting is the classic exponential one. 
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The second generation in the model is the future generation that for obviously reason has not 
decision making roles, it is the receiver of the residual stock of resources left unharvested by 
the first generation. Thus, there is an intergenerational transfer, the amount not harvested in 
the last period by the first generation is the initial stock for the subsequent generation: �1+𝑓𝑓�𝑔𝑔, 𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡)��𝑅𝑅(𝑇𝑇) − ℎ(𝑇𝑇) = 𝐷𝐷, (11) 
where D represents the initial stock for the second generation.  
Of course, if the first generation is absolutely selfish, nothing will be left to the next 
generation. However, total selfishness is not the real behavior of agents, as it is explicated in 
the retrospective on the other-regarding behaviors. Hence, in this model, the agent of the first 
generation takes care of the amount available for the successor because she has social 
preferences about the intergenerational distribution. So, the first generation leaves a given 
amount, D, unharvested at the end of the period T for the second generation. 
The amount D depends on the lifetime-expected enjoyed revenue that the first agent (or 
generation) obtains, 𝜋𝜋, given the instantaneous utility of the agent such that: 
𝜋𝜋 = � 𝑢𝑢�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 . (12) 
The transferred amount also depends on the intergenerational equity of the first generation, 
represented by a generic constant parameter, 𝛼𝛼, exogenous and unchangeable; hence, 𝐷𝐷 = 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼, 𝜋𝜋). (13) 
The amount transferred to the second generation increases with the increase in the lifetime 
enjoyed revenue of the first generation: 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷(𝛼𝛼, 𝜋𝜋)𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 > 0. (14) 
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At any period, the agent of first generation defines the harvesting plan including the expected 
amount to transfer to the second generation. 
 
5. Consequences of present-biased behaviors on the welfare of future generations in 
presence of other-regarding preferences 
The issue that it is questioned in this paragraph is how the adoption of the harvesting strategy 
influenced by present-biased preferences affects the intergenerational transfer, given the 
assumption of presence of social preferences. Understanding how the presence of present-
biased preferences can affect the transfer amount to the following generation is a necessary 
step to understand the context in which the social norms should be implemented. 
The intertemporal harvesting plan of the agent is given by the maximization of the utility 
function (10) under the constraints expressed in (2), (3), (4) and (5), the growth of the stock 
is given by (1) and the agent face the (11). To show the effect of present-biased preferences 
on the intergenerational transfer, in the first step, the effect on the lifetime-expected revenue 
enjoyed by the first generation must emerge.  
Hence, at time 0 the agent formulates the optimal harvesting plan for her lifetime: 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = �ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(0), … , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), … , ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇)�. (15) 
But, the agent adopts present-biased decisions so there are no guarantees about the time-
consistency of the choices time after time. In this manner, the strategy effectively 
implemented by the naive agent does not coincide with the initial long-run optimal plan 
formulated at time 0, so the harvesting plan implemented will be a biased one, expressed as: 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(0), … , ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), … , ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑇𝑇)}, (16) 
where Hbias is defined as the amounts that are derived time after time by the instantaneous 
maximization of the utility expressed in (10), under the constraints defined before, when β is 
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lower than 1. 
Because (9) implies that, with 0 < 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 < 𝑠𝑠, at time 0: 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 = 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1, (17) 
but later at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏: 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 > 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠+1, (18) 
then, at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, the agent harvests an amount greater in the biased harvesting plan, such that: ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). (19) 
The direct consequence of an increment of the current harvested amount is that, because we 
are in presence of just one optimal solution at each time, to divert away from the harvesting 
path that was guarantees the higher lifetime utility evaluated until the previous period. The 
consequence consistently with Persichina (2019a), will be that the lifetime-expected enjoyed 
revenue that the agent obtains in the biased harvesting plan adopted, 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠, can be lower than 
in the hypothetical optimal plan evaluated at time 0, 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡: 
� 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)� < � 𝑢𝑢 �ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 . (20) 
Hence, the present bias can induce the agent of the first generation to adopt a strategy that 
implies an expected enjoyed revenue, 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠, lower than that one expected at the beginning, 𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡. So the present bias can create inefficiency in the intertemporal management of the 
resources. How it will be showed soon this inefficiency persists even if the naive agent has 
spontaneous other-regarding preferences like in this model in which the first generation 
desires to leave some resources to the following generation but the amount to transfer 
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depends on the revenue of the first generation itself. 
Hence, considering that at time 0 the agent had defined a given harvesting plan, Hopt, such 
that she had predicted to obtain a given expected enjoyed revenue 𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, the predicted amount 
to leave for the future generation predicted at time 0 was defined in relation to the predicted 
revenue 𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, such that: 𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓�𝛼𝛼, 𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡�. (21) 
At time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, the present bias induces the agent to reevaluate her harvesting plan. The 
consequence, expressed in (20), can imply that the enjoyed revenue derived from the biased 
harvesting plan, 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠, is lower than 𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, such that at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, the transfer amount is 
reevaluated in the function of the new level of expected enjoyed revenue, 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠: 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼, 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠) (22) 
Thus, taking into account (14), a decrease in 𝜋𝜋 determines a decrease in the transfer amount 
such that: 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 <  𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡. (23) 
At this point, it is easy to understand that, when 𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 < 𝜋𝜋𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, period after period, when the 
effect of present-biased preferences emerges, the predicted transferred amount becomes 
smaller and smaller. In the final period T, the amount effectively left for the future generation 
will be lower than the amount that the agent would have left given the same intergenerational 
preferences but without the present bias that move her away from her long-run harvesting 
path. 
Therefore, a biased harvesting plan can determine a reduction in the maximum welfare 
available for the future generation. The second generation, hence, suffers the consequences 
of a bias that affects the previous generation, with the reduction of the initial stock of 
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resources that the second generation receives despite the initial other-regarding intentions of 
the first generation. For this reason this work aims to understand which properties a social 
norm should have to avoid the intergenerational inequality that can derive from present-
biased preferences in the intergenerational renewable resources management. 
 
6. Implementation of the social norm 
In the context in which the spontaneous social preferences of a present-biased agent are not 
sufficient to avoid the risks related to the present-biased discounting, an individual harvester 
could leave to the future generation less than she originally desired. In this case having the 
support of social norms that can induce her to apply a sort of self-commitment to her original 
choices it may be decisive. In fact, the compliance to social norms that require leaving an 
amount to the future generation not amenable to revision could offer the opportunity to 
commit the behavior of the agent to the first intention. The social norm, in this case, will be 
a nudge to facilitate the agent to behave conformal to her initial intention (Sunstein, 2014). 
The implementation of a social norm that prescribes to follow the initial harvesting plan can 
improve the intergenerational equity. In fact, when individuals act in accord with their own 
spontaneous intergenerational preferences, without being bound by any social norms, there 
is not a constraint that avoids the revaluation of the transfer amount. So the conservation of 
resources for future generations is not guaranteed. Conversely, the situation of the transferred 
amount could be different if the agent manifests her own intergenerational preferences with 
the compliance to a social norm that prescribes to donate to the future generation a 
determined amount, set out at the beginning of the harvesting periods, and thus, defined 
according to the initial stock of resources. For this reason, here an analysis of the presence 
of this kind of social norm is conducted. The goal is to define the main properties of a model 
that includes the disutility that derives from a violation of the social norm that prescribes that 
the amount transferred, defined at the beginning, must not be subject to revaluation.  
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The model assumes that the violation of a social norm implies for the agent a disutility that 
reduces the instantaneous utility in the moment in which the violation occurs. The disutility 
derived by a violation of the social norm is defined with η such that the instantaneous utility 
of the present harvesting is given by: 𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑢𝑢�ℎ(𝑡𝑡)� −  𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 . (24) 
It is assumed that at time tb if the agent harvest not more of the amount initially planned ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), the disutility that she receives is zero because there is not violation of the social 
norms. Otherwise, if she increases the harvesting above ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), she receives a disutility η 
that is a no decreasing function of the difference between the current harvesting and the 
amount in initially planned, ℎ(𝑡𝑡) − ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡),3 this difference is denote with γ, such that: 𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕  ≥ 0, (25) 
Moreover, η is also function of the parameter 𝛼𝛼∗ that represents the value that the agent 
assigns to comply with the social norm. Such that the disutility that the social norm generates 
when the agents violates the norm, 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼∗, 𝜕𝜕),4 increases with an increasing of 𝛼𝛼∗: 
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼∗,𝛾𝛾)𝜕𝜕𝛼𝛼∗ > 0, (26) 
Such that the disutility at time tb will be given by: 
 
3 A higher difference in the amount harvested represents a stronger violation of the social norm, consequently a 
bigger difference between the current harvesting and the amount initially planned should imply a higher 
disutility derived by the social norm, and in no case a decreasing disutility. 
4𝛼𝛼∗ is assumed exogenous and unchangeable. 
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𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 = � 0, ℎ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) ≤ ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼∗, 𝜕𝜕), ℎ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) (27) 
with 𝜕𝜕 = ℎ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) − ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) and 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼∗, 𝜕𝜕) > 0, 
So, the total expected utility of the agent at time tb is: 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 = � 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢�h(𝑡𝑡)� −  𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 , (28) 
with 
∂U∂𝜂𝜂 < 0 for 𝜂𝜂 > 0. 
Given the model just described, here the analysis is interested in define the two main 
peculiarities of the existence of a social norm that prescribes the non-revaluation: the 
necessary condition to have positive effects to reduce the overharvesting generates by 
present-biased preferences; and the sufficient condition to maintain the harvesting at the 
optimal level initially planned. 
6.1. Necessary condition 
The necessary condition is the condition such that a disutility derived by the violation of the 
social norm does not induce the agent to increase the harvesting above ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), and at the 
same time avoid the situation in which independently from the disutility derived by the social 
norm the agent will continue in any case to harvest ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). In fact, to have positive effects 
on the agent’s harvesting, the agent’s utility must be reduced when she does not behave in 
compliance with the social norm. But without the situation in which the reduction in the 
utility generated by non-compliance behavior induces the agent to further increase the 
harvesting amount even above ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏). 
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Here the necessary condition is enunciated:5 
Proposition 1: 
It is considered time tb in which ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) in absence of social norm. Defining 
with {H} the set of all feasible harvesting strategy defined for the interval [𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, T], and with 
{𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 }  ⊂  {H}  the subset of all the feasible alternative strategies to 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 . Assuming the 
presence of social norm such that the instantaneous utility of the present-biased agent at time 
tb is  𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) = 𝑢𝑢�ℎ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� −  𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 , assuming that 𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 is defined as in (27), and defining with ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) the amount that the agent harvests in presence of the social norm, if 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼∗, 𝜕𝜕) → 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 > 0 ∀ ℎ(𝑡𝑡) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡), (29) 
then  ∄ ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) ∶ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 ≽ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠∀ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 ∈ {𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 }. (30) 
So the necessary condition asserts that if the marginal disutility derived from the violation of 
the norms is increasing over the marginal increasing of the overharvesting in excess to the 
optimal amount initially planned, ℎ(𝑡𝑡) − ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡), in presence of social norm does not exist 
an amount greater than the present-biased amount harvested in absence of norm such that an 
harvesting path with an amount higher than ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) can be preferred by the agent. Hence, 
under the condition (29) the presence of a social norms that prescribes the non-revaluation 
cannot induce the naive agent to harvest an amount higher than the amount harvested in 
absence of social norm. 
It is so possible to assert that the social norm, in order to have the possibility to reduce the 
effect of present bias on the harvesting amount and consequently on the transferred amount 
 
5 The proof is presented in the appendix. 
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to the future generation, needs to generate a strictly marginal increasing disutility on the 
increasing of the difference between the amount effectively harvested and the amount 
initially planned. In fact, a strictly increasing disutility on the amount harvested in excess to ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡) in no cases will induce the agent to move further away from the harvesting path. A 
social norm with this peculiarity could reduce the effect of the present bias on the amount 
transferred to the future generation. 
6.2. Sufficient condition 
Now the focus is on the definition of the condition in which the existence of a social norms 
that prescribe to avoid the revaluation can guarantee the optimal harvesting path defined at 
the beginning, guaranteeing the optimality of the harvesting amount over the time and of the 
transferred amount to the following generation given the presence of other-regarding 
preferences and of social norms even when the agent has present-biased preferences.  
It is assumed that a higher difference in the amount harvested represents a stronger violation 
of the social norms, and consequently a bigger difference between the current harvesting and 
the amount initially planned should imply a higher disutility deriving from the social norm, 
such that 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 > 0, and this guarantees the condition expressed in the proposition 1. 
The time horizon [𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, 𝑇𝑇] is considered, because as explicated before it is assumed that time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 is the earlier period in which the agent reevaluate her harvesting amount for effect of the 
present bias, so the harvesting path adopted doesn’t differ from 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 until time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 − 1. 
In the model that is presented the sufficient condition that guarantees the compliance with 
the optimal harvesting path defined at the beginning has to satisfy the following: 
where ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) is the amount harvested at time t given the harvesting strategy 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 ∈ {Hj}, where 
{Hj} is the set of all the feasible strategies at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 alternative to 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡. 
𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� + 𝛽𝛽 � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)� > 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� + 𝛽𝛽 � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)� −  𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗  , (31) 
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When the (31) is satisfied the harvesting strategy defined before time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, is still the 
dominant one even at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏. 
This condition is always guaranteed when the marginal disutility for a marginal increasing of 
the difference ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) − ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡) is larger than the marginal utility evaluated for each harvesting 
amount in the interval �ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏),  ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� weighted for the present bias factor 𝛽𝛽. It is so 
possible to assert the following proposition that express the sufficient condition for the 
maintenance of the optimal harvesting path, neutralizing the effect of the present bias (the 
proof is showed in the appendix): 
Proposition 2: 
Given the presence of present-biased preferences represented by the parameter 𝛽𝛽 as 
expressed in the utility function in (10) and the existence of social norms that affect the utility 
of the agent has express in (27)  and (28) with 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 > 0. Defining in the interval [0, 𝑇𝑇] the 
optimal harvesting strategy 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡, defining with {H} the set of all the feasible strategy for the 
interval [𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, 𝑇𝑇] , defining with {𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗} ⊂  {H} the subset of {H} that include all the strategy 
alternative to 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 , subset that includes even the strategy adopted by the agent in absence of 
social norm, 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 , if: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑗𝑗𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 ≥ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑢𝑢′�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)�,   ∀ ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) ∈ �ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏),  ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� , (32) 
Then at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 : 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗  ∀ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 ∈ {𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗} ⊂ {𝐻𝐻} ∶ 𝐸𝐸�𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡� >  𝐸𝐸[𝑈𝑈𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠  ] ∀ 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ∈ [0, 𝑇𝑇] ˄  𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1). (33) 
The proposition just defined clarifies the sufficient condition that guarantees, in presence of 
the social norm that prescribe the non-revaluation of the amount initially planned, that a naive 
present-biased agent will maintain the optimal harvesting path defined at the beginning. This 
is also the condition that can guarantees the sustainability of the resources if the amount 
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initially planned to transfer to the following generation is defined in accord to 
intergenerational social preferences that ensure the sustainability of the resources. 
Hence, In the case of a social norm that, like in this model, prescribes that the amount defined 
at the beginning, must not be subject to revaluation, the social norm is also an opportunity to 
commit the behavior of the agent. So, the presence of constraint arising from the social norm 
can lead the individual to mitigate the reevaluation of the amount to leave to the future 
generation. Moreover, under the condition express in the proposition 2 the implementation 
of a social norm can avoid the reevaluation of the amount of resources to leave to the future 
generations, reducing the risk of overexploitation for effect of the intertemporal myopia of a 
naive present-biased agent.  
 
7. Discussion and final remarks 
It is clear that in the context of renewable resources the action of one generation imposes 
externalities on the subsequent generations. This work has discussed that the choices 
influenced by present-biased preferences can lead the first generation to leave to the second 
one less than what the first generation itself wanted. It is essentially an intergenerational 
preference reversal, in which the original intentions of people managing resource stocks get 
influenced by the strong temptation of the present, eroding the resource volumes to leave to 
future generations. In fact, it is observed the conflict between the individual’s preferences 
when they are not subject to pressures from the present and the choices actually made when 
preferences are influenced by present bias. Thus, the strategic short-sightedness imposed by 
the “dictatorship of the present” can cause the agents choices to divert away from optimal 
choices causing a reduction in the well-being of future generations despite the existence of 
strong social preferences. 
Thus present bias can imply serious damages in terms of intergenerational equity and 
sustainability of resources level for future generations, even when the welfare of future 
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generations is supported by other-regarding preferences. The other-regarding preferences of 
a naive agent do not guarantee that the harvesting path will match with what is considered 
desirable and initially optimal. Resource management and conservation for future 
generations appears to be a complex task, which could not be fully solved by the spontaneous 
behavior of naive agents who are unable to self-commit. Even if a generation has spontaneous 
and intrinsic intergenerational preferences, the sustainability of resources for future 
generations faces the limit that in the process of decision-making over time, the choices made 
can be insufficient to keep the harvesting plan that leaves the resources amount initially 
suggested. If this amount had been defined in terms of sustainability for the future generation, 
the very sustainability of resources, even if desired by the present generation, would be 
compromised. 
Faced with this problem, this study has investigated the role of the social norm of no 
reevaluation of the amount designed for the future generation. The result obtained with the 
model presented in this paper has shown that if the social preferences of the individual are 
not left only and exclusively to their own spontaneous behavior, and if these social 
preferences are expressed by social norms that can represent the individuals social 
preferences, a mitigation and a neutralization of the effect of present bias on the 
intergenerational equity can occur. This result is related to the idea that decisions about to 
compliance/no-compliance to given social norms are part of the decision making process of 
the agent and it is also part of her preferences. In fact, individuals also express their 
preferences through specific social norms that they believe in. Hence, by compliance with 
these norms, individuals express their own preferences toward other members of the 
community. Individuals with social preferences do not act in isolation from the community 
they belong to. The manner in which social norms affect individuals’ behavior is one of the 
prerogatives of human society. A community is also based on the relatively widespread 
adoption of specific social norms and clearly identifiable habits, whose adoption by an 
individual qualifies her in very specific terms. The compliance with social norms, in fact, 
elicits the self-image of the agents. Agents receive a benefit by expressing themselves 
through actions that are in compliance with their self-image and social identity. So 
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compliance to social norms is in this way an expressive utility (Sunstein and Reisch, 2014). 
Furthermore, the social disapproval can induce individuals to conform to the social norm: 
they obtain utility from the social endorsement or moral utility (Levitt and List, 2007). 
Consistently with this approach, the Analysis of the role of the social norm conducted in this 
paper shows that to have the possibility to reduce the effect of present bias on the transferred 
amount to the future generation, the social norm should generate a strictly marginal 
increasing disutility that the agent receives by the increase of the difference between the 
amount effectively harvested and the amount initially planned. So the disutility of a non-
compliant behavior to the norm has to target the present behavior of the agent by reducing 
her utility in relation to the increase of her present harvesting compared to the amount initially 
planned. 
One of the main contribution that this paper are also offered is the definition of the condition 
in which the adoption of social norm can guarantees the neutralization of the effect of present 
bias on the transferred amount to the future generation. Specifically, it is been proofed that if 
the marginal disutility derived from the violation of the social norm is larger than the present-
biased weighted marginal utility even a naive agent will maintain the harvesting path that 
guarantees the optimality initially defined. It is so showed the positive and important role 
that social norms that sustain other-regarding preferences of the agents have in the 
intergenerational equity in the management of renewable resources. 
The social constraint that arises from the norm in this model, while an expression of the same 
other-regarding preferences, offsets the effects of short-sighted behaviors — where a naive 
agent takes her own decisions only under the influence of present bias — that in absence of 
social norms are without substantial barriers. In the context of intertemporal management of 
resources, the social norms should have the crucial role of expressing the other-regarding 
preferences of the agent such that the she can keep the harvesting path as close as possible to 
the optimal one with a high compliance to the social norm. In fact, if the presence of the 
other-regarding preferences - that are necessary and essential - is not sufficient to guarantee 
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the intergenerational equity, the agent’s behavior need to be sustained by specific institutional 
mechanisms and brought into the community by social norms that suggest the behaviors more 
appropriately for guaranteeing the equity and availability of the resources between the 
different generations. 
In conclusion, the results obtained suggest that the transfer of resources to future generations 
can be preserved by respecting the preferences of the current generation and implementing a 
social norm that defines given behavioral heuristics. The social norm must be implemented 
in a manner such that the social preferences of the members of the community are expressed 
not only by the volume of resources they leave to the next generation, but also according to 
how this amount matches the amount initially assessed. Indeed this would facilitate the 
effective maintenance of resource stocks to be allocated to future generations. 
 
Appendix 
Proof Proposition 1: 
At time tb, when the agent is induced by the present bias to reevaluate her harvesting plan. 
The amount ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), with ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), is the only amount harvestable at time tb 
such that: 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 ≻ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏  ∀ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 ∈ {𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏}                                                                                     ( i ) 
Where with {H} is defined the set of all feasible harvesting strategy defined for the interval 
[𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏, T], and with {𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏}  ⊂  {H}  the subset of all the feasible alternative strategies to 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 . 
So, taking into account the disutility derived by the violation of the social norm, the condition 
that guarantees that ( i ) is still true requires that: 
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� 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)� −  𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 > � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 ,                                                ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
with  𝜂𝜂 ≥ 0. 
It is taken into account all the alternative strategies to 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠  in the subset {𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏} that imply: ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) 
Remembering that at time 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏: 
𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� −  𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� < � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 − � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 , 
the ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) is satisfied for every 𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏  ≥ 𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏. 
The model assumes 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾  ≥ 0 so if  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 = 0 then 𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏 =  𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏, in this second case the harvesting 
decision is neutral to the social norm, while if  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 > 0 then  (𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 − 𝜂𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑏) < 0, consequently: 
If  
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 > 0, then  ∄ ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏): 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 ≽ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠∀ 𝐻𝐻𝑏𝑏 ∈ {𝐻𝐻} 
Proof Proposition 2: 
The agent will maintain the harvesting amount defined in the optimal harvesting plan if: 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗  ∀ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗 ∈ �𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗� ⊂  {H} 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗| ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) <  ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)                                        ( 𝑖𝑖 )  
that implies: 
𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� + 𝛽𝛽 � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)� > 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� + 𝛽𝛽 � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)� −  𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 
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consequently ( i ) is true if: 
𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� − 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� + 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽  >  � � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)� − � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)��  ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
because 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 > 0 ∧  𝛽𝛽 < 1 and because : 
𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� − 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� > � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)� − � 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏+1 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡)� 
 ( ii ) is true when: 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� − 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� + 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽  ≥ 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� − 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)�                                                                 ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
So if: 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽 ≥ 𝛽𝛽 − 1𝛽𝛽 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� + 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝑢𝑢�ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)� 
from which: 
𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 ≥ (1 − 𝛽𝛽) � 𝑢𝑢′[ℎ(𝑡𝑡)]ℎ𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) 𝑑𝑑ℎ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)                                                                                                    ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
From ( iiii ) finally ( i ) is true when: 
𝜕𝜕𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ≥ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑢𝑢′[ℎ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)],    ∀  ℎ𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) ∈ �ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏), ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)�                                                           ( 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) 
Because the monotonicity of the utility function and 𝛽𝛽 < 1, ( iiiii ) requires: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏𝜕𝜕𝛾𝛾 > 0, that it is the necessary condition defined in the proposition 1. 
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